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Marrying	 European	 and	 Domestic	 Politics?	 Investigating	 the	
European	 Dimension	 of	 the	 2013	Croatian	 Marriage	 Referendum	
using	a	Value-Based	Euroscepticism	framework	
Koen	Slootmaeckers	&	Indraneel	Sircar	
		
Abstract	On	1	December	2013,	Croatia	voted	in	a	referendum	on	the	constitutional	definition	of	marriage.	Whilst	 recent	 scholarship	 highlighted	 the	 symbolism	 nature	 of	 the	 referendum	 in	 domestic	politics,	its	European	dimension	has	not	been	reflected	on.	Using	Leconte’s	notion	of	value-based	Euroscepticism	 this	 article	 explores	 the	 role	of	European	politics	 in	 the	marriage	 referendum,	using	electoral	data	at	the	municipal	level.	As	the	analysis	demonstrates	that	the	referendum,	at	least	 partly,	 was	 a	 proactive	 attempt	 to	 halt	 the	 Europeanisation	 of	 same-sex	 marriage,	 the	article	also	sheds	light	on	local	resistance	to	EU’s	homonationalist	politics.			
Keywords:	 Value-based	 Euroscepticism,	 LGBT,	 Same-sex	 Marriage,	 Euroscepticism,	 Referendum,	
Croatia			
Introduction	Five	months	after	Croatia	 joined	 the	European	Union	 (EU),	 voters	approved	a	 citizen-initiated	referendum	 to	 constitutionally	 define	marriage	 as	 heterosexual	matrimony,	with	 campaigners	both	for	and	against	the	initiative	tying	Lesbian,	Gay,	Bisexual,	and	Transgender	(LGBT)	rights	to	the	EU	and	a	notion	of	‘Europeanness.’	Such	link	between	European	Union	(EU)	and	LGBT	rights	is	 not	 new,	 and	 has	 often	 been	 highlighted	 during	 ‘Eastern’	 enlargement	 for	 post-socialist	European	states	(see	Slootmaeckers,	Touquet	and	Vermeersch	2016),	including	during	Croatia’s	accession	process.	Indeed,	whilst	Croatia	was	pressured	by	the	EU	to	improve	its	record	on	the	protection	of	LGBT	people	during	accession	processes,	especially	 in	 the	 field	of	discrimination	(Badanjak	 2014;	Kahlina	 2015),	 local	 LGBT	 activists	 used	 the	EU	 leverage	 to	 strengthen	 their	advocacy	 work	 (Kahlina	 2015;	 Slootmaeckers	 and	 Touquet,	 2016),	 with	 some	 politicians	instrumentalising	relevant	issues	by	asserting	the	‘Europeanness’	of	LGBT	rights	(Vuletić	2013).	Despite	the	fact	that	the	link	between	the	EU	and	LGBT	rights	has	been	acknowledged	by	both	supporters	and	opponents	of	LGBT	rights	(Ayoub	and	Paternotte,	2014),	the	academic	analysis	
	of	 the	 2013	 marriage	 referendum	 (see	 e.g.	 Glaurdić	 and	 Vuković	 2016)	 has	 paid	 little	 to	 no	attention	to	the	European	dimension	of	LGBT	politics.	Political	analysts,	on	the	other	hand,	did	make	the	 link	with	the	fact	the	Croatia	recently	 joined	the	EU.	They	argued	that	the	success	of	the	 civic	 initiative’s	 U	 Ime	 Obitelji	 (‘In	 the	 name	 of	 the	 Family’)	 campaign	 against	 same-sex	marriage	could	partly	be	explained	by	the	initiative’s	ability	to	tap	into	growing	disappointment	of	 the	 Croatian	 people	 in	 the	 EU,	 which	 many	 blamed	 for	 the	 nation’s	 economic	 recession	(Bilefsky	2013).	These	claims,	however,	have	never	been	tested	against	voting	behaviour	in	the	referendum.	 Whilst	 our	 contribution	 seeks	 to	 provide	 empirical	 evidence	 for	 these	 political	analysts’	 claims,	 its	 main	 aim	 is	 to	 further	 recent	 scholarly	 debates	 on	 the	 referendum	 that	concluded	that	the	results	could	be	primarily	explained	by	support	for	the	main	electoral	blocs	in	the	country,	with	value-based	and	other	factors	being	secondary	(Glaurdić	and	Vuković	2016).	Indeed,	we	argue	that	the	European	dimension	of	same-sex	union	politics	cannot	be	ignored	for	at	 least	 two	 reasons.	 First,	 the	 referendum	 campaign	was	 initiated	 at	 a	 time	 in	which	 Croatia	formally	 joined	the	EU,	which	raises	the	question	whether	the	co-occurrence	of	both	historical	moments	was	 a	 coincidence	or	not.	 Second,	 and	more	 importantly,	 it	 is	undeniable	 that	LGBT	issues	in	Croatia	have	a	European	character.	 Indeed,	as	already	mentioned,	as	part	of	Croatia’s	EU	accession	process,	LGBT	rights	have	increasingly	been	framed	as	a	European	value	(Kahlina	2015;	 Kuhar	 2011;	 2012;	 Moss	 2014).1	This	 was	 especially	 the	 case	 in	 the	 closely	 related	parliamentary	 debates	 same-sex	 partnerships.	 Indeed,	 Kuhar	 (2011)	 has	 shown	 that	 both	supporters	 and	 opponents	 have	 used	 a	 ‘Europeanisation’	 frame	 in	 the	 debates	 on	 same-sex	partnerships,	both	before	and	during	accession	negotiations.	Whilst	the	idea	of	an	LGBT-tolerant	Europe	served	as	an	example	for	those	willing	to	advance	LGBT	rights,	opponents	often	argued	that	Croatia	should	refrain	from	adopting	legislation	which	goes	against	Croatian	values	(Kuhar																																									 																					1	It	 is	 important	 to	 note,	 however,	 that	 LGBT	 activism	 precedes	 the	 start	 of	 Croatia’s	 EU	 integration	process,	 and	 that	 the	 first	 same-sex	 partnership	 law	 (2003)	was	 adopted	 before	 the	 start	 of	 accession	negotiations.	 We,	 therefore,	 do	 not	 argue	 that	 LGBT	 politics	 in	 Croatia	 are	 solely	 the	 result	 of	 the	 EU	accession	process,	but	rather	that	the	EU	has	become	an	 important	part	of	LGBT	politics	 in	Croatia	(see	also	Kahlina	2015).		
	2011).	 Thus,	 taking	 this	 historical	 and	discursive	 context	 into	 account,	 our	 analysis	 highlights	the	on	the	international	dimension	of	the	referendum.	By	doing	so,	this	article	also	contributes	to	more	general	debates	on	international	LGBT	politics	and	 its	 symbolism	 in	 the	 field	of	European	politics.	 In	particular,	we	seek	 to	add	 to	 the	recent	debates	 on	 local	 resistance	 against	 (European)	 ‘homonationalism.’	 Homonationalism,	 as	 a	conceptual	 framework,	 was	 developed	 by	 Puar	 (2007;	 see	 also	 Puar	 2013)	 following	 the	observation	 that	nation	states	are	 increasingly	defined	and	 judged	by	 their	gay-friendliness	or	homophobia.	 Puar	 defined	 homonationalism	 as	 	 ‘a	 facet	 of	 modernity	 and	 a	 historical	 shift	marked	by	the	entrance	of	(some)	homosexual	bodies	as	worthy	of	protection	by	nation-states,	a	constitutive	and	fundamental	reorientation	of	the	relationship	between	the	state,	capitalism,	and	sexuality’	 (Puar	 2013,	 p.	 337).	 Whilst	 some	 countries	 and	 entities,	 including	 the	 EU,	 have	embraced	 this	 historical	 moment	 by	 increasingly	 using	 LGBT	 rights	 as	 a	 symbol	 for	 what	 it	means	 to	be	modern	or	even	European	(see	also	Ayoub	and	Paternotte	2014),	others,	 like	e.g.	Putin-led	 Russia,	 have	 been	 resisting	 this	 development	 by	 emphasising	 an	 alternative	 value	system	 based	 on	 so-called	 traditional	 values.	 Whilst	 examples	 of	 such	 resistance	 to	 EU’s	homonationalist	 politics	 have	 been	 documented	 in	 the	 EU’s	 neighbourhood,	 e.g.	 in	 Ukraine,	 it	can	also	be	found	within	the	boundaries	of	the	EU.	Consider	for	example	recent	developments	in	Central	and	Eastern	European	(CEE)	member	states.	Although	the	CEE	EU	member	states	have	passed	several	laws	regulating	LGBT	rights	(mostly	in	the	field	of	anti-discrimination)	during	the	period	leading	up	to	accession	(Kochenov	2006),	LGBT	rights	are	said	to	have	only	entered	the	political	 agenda	 as	 a	 result	 of	 international	 (EU)	 pressure	 (Roseneil	 and	 Stoilova	 2011).	Consequently,	 LGBT	 rights	 in	 some	 of	 the	 new	 member	 state	 became	 pollicised	 accession	(O'Dwyer	 2012;	 Slootmaeckers	 and	 Touquet	 2016).	 Indeed,	 whereas	 the	 pressure	 for	 equal	LGBT	rights	was	seen	as	a	litmus	test	for	modernity	and	Europeanness	by	those	supporting	the	‘civilizing	mission’	of	the	EU	(Graff	2006),	it	fuelled	anger	towards	the	EU	for	those	who	consider	the	 pressure	 for	 LGBT	 equality	 as	 a	 threat	 to	 the	 nation	 and	 local	 culture	 (Renkin	 2009).	 For	
	example,	in	Latvia,	the	pressure	for	equal	rights	for	LGBT	persons	was	seen	as	a	direct	attack	of	the	 so-called	 international	 gay	 lobby	 on	 the	 future	 of	 the	 nation	 (Mole	 2011).	 In	 Poland,	 the	Kaczyński	government	stated	at	one	point	that	it	needed	to	prevent	the	‘aggressive	promotion	of	homosexuality’	because	it	felt	that	‘although	Poland	may	have	joined	the	EU,	they	will	have	none	of	 the	 “loose”	 attitudes	 toward	 sex’	 (Graff	 2006,	 p.	 436).	 Thus,	 by	 analysing	 the	 European	dimensions	 of	 the	 Croatian	 marriage	 referendum,	 we	 also	 analyse	 resistance	 to	 ‘European	homonationalism,’	i.e.	the	article	demonstrates	how	international	LGBT	politics	can	be	employed	in	domestic	politics,	guiding	voting	behaviour	 in	a	referendum	on	a	policy	 field	seemingly	 free	from	international	influence.				Whilst	 some	have	 linked	 this	 the	opposition	 to	nationalism	 (see	e.g.	Mole	2011,	2016),	Ayoub	(2014)	draws	attention	to	‘threat	perception.’	Doing	so,	he	expanded	the	nationalism	argument	by	highlighting	that	domestic	opposition	to	the	international	promotion	of	LGBT	rights,	and	thus	the	homonationalist	moment,	is	mediated	by	the	relative	role	of	religion	in	the	imagining	of	the	nation.	He	has	argued	that	‘[t]hreat	perception	concerning	LGBT	norms	depends	largely	on	the	degree	 to	which	 the	moral	authority	of	religious	 institutions	 is	 tied	 to	 the	histories	of	political	transition	and	national	identity’	(Ayoub	2014,	p.357).	Thus,	in	countries	where	the	Church	has	a	considerable	 role	 in	 defining	 the	 ‘nation’	 (like	 in	 the	 case	 of	 Croatia,	 see	 Pavasovic	 Trost	 and	Slootmaeckers	2015),	 LGBT	 rights	 as	promoted	by	 the	EU	 can	be	perceived	as	 a	 threat	 to	 the	nation.	 Whilst	 these	 ideas	 are	 indeed	 valuable,	 we	 believe	 they	 do	 not	 necessarily	 reflect	explicitly	 enough	 on	 the	 European	 dimension	 of	 LGBT	 politics.	 As	 such,	 and	 based	 on	 the	observation	that	LGBT	issues	have	seemingly	settled	themselves	on	the	schism	of	pro-	and	anti-EU	politics	(Mole	2011),	we	propose	the	notion	of	‘value-based	Euroscepticism’	(Leconte	2014)	as	 an	 alternative	 analytical	 framework	 for	 the	 study	 of	 domestic	 resistance	 to	 European	homonationalist	 politics.	 Value-based	 Euroscepticism,	 Leconte	 (2014)	 argues,	 is	 a	 negative	attitude	towards	the	EU	fundamental	rights	policy,	which	is	perceived	as	potentially	 infringing	on	 domestic	 value	 systems.	 Distinct	 from	 negative	 attitudes	 towards	 EU	 membership,	 value-
	based	 Euroscepticism	 should	 be	 defined	 as	 ‘the	 subjective	 perception	 that,	 as	 integration	deepens,	EU	institutions	unduly	interfere	in	matters	where	not	only	strongly	held	collective	and	societal	preferences,	but	more	fundamentally	value	systems	are	at	stake’	(Leconte	2014,	p.	85),	including	 issues	 such	 as	 the	definition	of	marriage.2	Although	 this	 value-based	Euroscepticism	might	 seem	 unjustified	 in	 policy	 areas	 outside	 EU	 competences,	 such	 as	 the	 definition	 of	marriage,	 Leconte	 (2014,	 p.	 86)	 continues,	 ‘many	 Eurosceptics	 fear	 that	 there	might	 be	 some	kind	 of	 spillover	 process	 where,	 ultimately,	 EU	 legislation	 in	 one	 policy	 area	 might	 have	 an	indirect	impact	on	policy	areas	within	the	remit	of	Member	States’.	Fears	that	the	EU	Charter	of	Fundamental	Rights	would	help	to	spread	alternative	understandings	of	the	family	are	not	new	in	Europe	(Leconte	2008).	Kopecký	and	Mudde	(2002,	p.	315),	for	example,	found	that	that	the	Slovak	 Christian	 Democratic	 Movement	 ‘openly	 expresse[d]	 fears	 that	 the	 EU	 will	 pressure	Slovakia	 to	adopt	policies	such	as	 the	 legalization	of	gay	marriages.’	Although	the	EU	does	not	actively	pressure	(candidate)	member	states	to	adopt	same-sex	union	policies	—	the	EU	has	no	family	law	competences	—,	recent	evidence	has	shown	that	such	spillover	effects	do	exist.	With	respect	 to	 same-sex	 partnership	 legislation,	 Kuhar	 (2012)	 has	 shown	 that	 Europeanisation	frames	 act	 as	 soft	 pressure	 on	member	 states	 to	 organise	 same-sex	partnership	 issues	 in	 line	with	 EU	 standards	 or	 trends.	 Kollman	 (2009)	 and	 Paternotte	 and	 Kollman	 (2013)	 have	 also	highlighted	the	role	of	informal	European	processes	of	norm	diffusion	and	elite	socialisation	in	the	increased	recognition	of	same-sex	unions	across	the	continent.	Thus,	it	could	be	expected	that	the	referendum	represents,	at	least	partly,	a	proactive	reaction	to	the	EU’s	fundamental	rights	policy.	Whilst	anecdotal	evidence	supports	this	hypothesis	—	a	lead	campaigner	 for	 the	 referendum,	 for	 example,	 stated:	 ‘There	 is	 a	 feeling	 that	 gay	marriage	 and	adoption	by	gays	was	on	the	agenda,	and	this	vote	was	an	attempt	to	show	that	there	is	strong																																									 																					2	It	is	important	to	note	that	value-based	Euroscepticism	does	not	need	to	align	with	anti-EU	membership	attitudes.	Although	both	dimensions	of	 Euroscepticism	are	 certainly	 correlated,	 it	 is	 quite	possible	 that	individuals	sceptical	of	the	fundamental	rights	policy	of	the	EU	and	its	potential	domestic	impact	do	not	question	 EU	membership.	 Although	 this	 distinction	 goes	 in	 both	 directions,	 it	 is	much	more	 likely	 that	individuals	opposing	EU	membership	also	question	the	fundamental	rights	policy	of	the	EU.		
	opposition	to	this’	(quoted	in	Bilefsky	2013).	However,	it	is	yet	to	be	demonstrated	whether	the	outcome	of	the	referendum	was	indeed	guided	by	value-based	Euroscepticism.		Empirically,	 we	 examine	 the	 European	 dimension	 of	 the	marriage	 referendum	 at	 the	 level	 of	cities	 and	 municipalities,	 following	 common	 practice	 in	 referendum	 research	 (on	 marriage	referendums	 see,	 e.g.,	 Glaurdić	 and	Vuković	 2016;	McVeigh	 and	Diaz	 2009;	 for	 other	 types	 of	referendums	 see,	 e.g.,	 Charnysh	 2015;	 Muñoz	 and	 Guinjoan	 2013).	 By	 linking	 the	 marriage	referendum	to	the	previous	(2012)	EU	referendum	and	the	2013	European	Parliament	elections,	the	article	explores	whether	there	is	evidence	of	a	relationship	between	the	Croatian	marriage	referendum	and	anti-EU	politics,	and	 thus	whether	referendum	voting	behaviour	 is	associated	with	value-based	Euroscepticism	in	Croatia.	To	do	so,	we	have	compiled	a	dataset	that	combines	the	 results	 from	 the	 2012	 EU	 accession	 referendum,	 the	 2013	marriage	 referendum,	 and	 the	2013	European	Parliament	Elections,3	and	added	socio-demographic	characteristics	of	the	cities	and	municipalities	 using	 data	 from	 the	 2011	 census	 data.	Due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 aggregate-level	data	 does	 not	 allow	 for	 drawing	 conclusions	 on	 individual-level	 behaviour,	 we	 deem	 it	important	 to	 first	 establish	 whether	 value-based	 Euroscepticism	 can	 contribute	 to	homonegative	 attitudes.	 This	 preliminary	 analysis	 is	 not	 to	 determine	 the	 role	 of	 value-based	Euroscepticism	 in	 individual	 voting	 behaviour,	 but	 is	 a	 baseline	 analysis	 to	 establish	whether	there	is	sufficient	evidence	suggesting	a	link	between	value-based	Euroscepticism	and	attitudes	towards	homosexuality	at	the	individual	level.	We	do	this	because	we	believe	that	analysing	the	referendum’s	 aggregate	 voting	 behaviour	 using	 a	 value-based	 Euroscepticism	 analytical	framework	would	only	make	sense	if	such	a	link	would	exist	at	the	individual	level.	In	sum,	the	reader	 should	bear	 in	mind	 that	our	 results	only	 speak	 to	 the	aggregate	 level	 and	 cannot	 and	should	not	be	translated	to	the	individual	analysis.	
																																								 																					3	These	European	Union	related	electoral	data	is	included	as	a	proxy	for	Euroscepticism.	It	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	article	to	conduct	a	comparative	analysis	of	the	2012	and	2013	referendums.	
	To	 summarise,	 our	 contributions	 to	 existing	 scholarship	 are	 three-fold.4	Our	 most	 obvious	contribution	 is	 extending	 the	 current	 debates	 on	 the	marriage	 referendum	 by	 demonstrating	that	 there	 were	 ‘European’	 dimensions	 to	 the	 result.	 Doing	 so,	 we	 also	 provide	 empirical	evidence	 for	 various	 claims	 made	 by	 Croatian	 political	 analysts	 regarding	 the	 referendum	results.	 Our	 third	 contribution,	 which	 also	 relates	 to	 more	 general	 scholarly	 debates	 is	 our	analysis	of	how	 international	LGBT	politics	 can	guide	political	behaviour	 in	 terms	of	domestic	resistance	 to	 European	 ‘homonationalism,’	 using	 value-based	 Euroscepticism	 alternative	analytical	framework	to	explain	feelings	of	threats	to	national	values.	The	latter	contribution	is	particularly	 salient	 not	 only	 in	 Croatia,	 but	 across	 new	 EU	 member	 states	 as	 well	 as	 for	understanding	LGBT	politics	in	the	EU’s	near	neighbourhood.						In	the	next	section,	we	briefly	present	the	background	of	the	marriage	referendum,	followed	by	a	discussion	 of	 our	 datasets	 and	 the	 variables	 used	 to	measure	 attitudes	 towards	 the	EU	 at	 the	individual	 level	and	proxies	used	 for	value-based	Euroscepticism	at	 the	municipal	 level.	 In	 the	subsequent	sections,	we	present	the	results	of	our	analyses	and	discuss	the	extent	to	which	the	framework	 of	 value-based	 Euroscepticism	 helps	 explaining	 the	 outcome	 of	 the	 marriage	referendum.		
The	2013	Croatian	Marriage	Referendum		
																																								 																					4	A	potential	fourth	contribution	of	our	analysis	relates	to	discussions	on	Euroscepticsm.	In	recent	years,	scholars	have	sought	to	understand	the	growing	public	opposition	to	the	EU,	increasingly	focussing	on	the	role	 of	 social	 identity	 attitudes.	 In	 these	 studies,	 Euroscepticism	 is	 explained	 by	 a	 strong	 identification	with	 their	 nation	 (e.g.	 Carey	 2002),	 xenophobia	 and	 opposition	 to	 migration	 (e.g.	 De	 Vreese	 and	Boomgaarden	2005),	and	religious	intolerance	(e.g.	Hobolt	et	al.	2011).	Whilst	most	of	these	studies	focus	on	the	determinants	of	Euroscepticism,	 little	has	been	written	on	how	Euroscepticism	can	contribute	to	these	social	 identity	variables.	This	article	addresses	this	gap;	it	does	so	by	analysing	to	what	extent	the	outcome	of	 the	2013	marriage	referendum	in	Croatia	was	 inspired	by	a	value	dimension	of	Eurosceptic	attitudes.	
	The	 history	 of	 the	 2013	Marriage	 referendum	 starts	 in	 2010,	 when	 a	 Croatian	 constitutional	amendment	was	passed	that	removed	the	requirement	 for	50%	turnout	 for	referendums.	This	constitutional	change	was	the	result	of	a	widespread	believe	amongst	politicians	and	scholars	a	low	turnout	requirement	would	be	an	obstacle	for	a	valid	referendum	result	on	EU	accession	–	which	would	block	any	 further	progress	 towards	membership	 (Podolnjak	2014).	Whilst	 these	fears	were	justified,	and	the	constitutional	amendments	removing	the	quorum	did	allow	Croatia	to	successfully	vote	for	EU	accession	(with	a	turnout	of	less	than	44	percent;	65.32	percent	voted	in	 favour),	 it	 ‘indirectly	 facilitated’	 the	 passage	 of	 the	 2013	 marriage	 referendum	 (Orsolic	Dalessio	2014).		Within	a	structural	context	characterised	by	relaxed	requirements	 for	a	referendum	by	citizen	petition	and	faced	with	Government’s	plans	enact	a	law	to	recognise	same-sex	‘life	partnerships’	(Barilar	and	Turčin	2013),	 the	civic	 initiative	U	Ime	Obitelji	(In	the	Name	of	the	Family),	 led	by	Željka	Markić	and	with	extensive	yet	indirect	support	of	the	Catholic	Church5,	collected	around	700,000	 signatures	 over	 a	 two-week	 period	 in	May	 2013	 in	 support	 of	 a	 referendum	 on	 the	question:	 ‘Do	 you	 support	 introduction	 of	 a	 provision	 into	 the	Constitution	 of	 the	Republic	 of	Croatia	 to	 the	effect	 that	marriage	 is	a	 living	union	of	a	woman	and	a	man?’	 (Zenit	2013).	The	number	 of	 signatures	 crossed	 the	 threshold	 of	 ten	 percent	 of	 the	 electorate,	 necessitating	 a	referendum	of	which	 the	result	would	be	 legally	binding.	 It	was	 the	 first	Croatian	referendum	held	at	citizens’	request.		Whereas	government-initiated	referendums	appear	to	provide	governments	with	opportunities	for	strategic	manoeuvring,	 including	the	evasion	of	accountability	for	difficult	decisions	(Setälä	2006,	p.	712),	 this	 citizen-initiated	referendum	created	a	precarious	situation	 for	 the	Croatian	government.	Moreover,	 the	petition	 for	 the	referendum	presented	a	number	of	awkward	 legal	questions,	particularly	whether	the	constitutionally	defined	mechanism	for	a	referendum	can	be																																									 																					5	Over	80	percent	of	Croatian	citizens	are	Catholic,	according	to	the	2011	census.	The	Catholic	Church	thus	has	 an	 influential	 role	 in	 shaping	 the	 political	 and	 legal	 order	 in	 the	 ‘most	 Catholic	 country	 in	 Europe’	(Perica	2006).	
	used	on	issues	which	may	be	discriminatory	to	a	group	of	citizens,	contravening	constitutional	protections	of	 fundamental	 freedoms	 (Podolnjak	2014).	 In	November	2013,	 the	month	before	the	referendum	was	held,	the	Constitutional	Court	delivered	an	opinion	that	there	was	no	legal	impediment	for	the	referendum	to	proceed.	However,	the	Court	also	said	that	a	positive	result	in	the	 referendum	 should	 not	 be	 detrimental	 to	 future	 developments	 in	 rights	 for	 same-sex	partnerships	in	accordance	with	the	fact	that	‘[r]espect	for	and	legal	protection	of	each	person’s	private	and	family	life,	dignity,	reputation	shall	be	guaranteed’.6	Moreover,	a	joint	statement	by	legal	scholars	from	the	University	of	Zagreb	expressed	the	opinion	that	blocking	the	referendum	would	have	dire	 consequences	 for	 the	democratic	 legitimacy	of	 the	country	and	 that	approval	must	be	legally	binding	(as	per	constitution;	Podolnjak	2014).7	The	 campaign	 leading	 up	 to	 the	 referendum	 divided	 the	 country.	 The	 Prime	 Minister	 and	President	 Ivo	 Josipović,	 along	with	 left-leaning	 parties	 in	 Croatia	 urged	 the	 electorate	 to	 vote	against	 the	 question	 in	 the	 referendum.	 Meanwhile,	 the	 leader	 of	 the	 opposition,	 Tomislav	Karamarko,	his	HDZ	(Hrvatska	Demokratska	Zajednica	[Croatian	Democratic	Union])	colleagues,	and	 other	 parties	 from	 the	 right	 said	 that	 they	 supported	 the	 constitutional	 definition	 of	marriage	 (Beta	2013).	Although	 the	 referendum	was	endorsed	by	 religious	organisations,	 and	representatives	of	the	Catholic	Church,	Orthodox	Church,	and	Islam,	the	campaign	was	framed	in	terms	 of	 democratic	 will	 and	 the	 protection	 Croatian	 values	 related	 to	marriage	 and	 family.8	Markić	described	 the	U	Ime	Obitelji	 position	as	 follows:	 ‘it	 is	precisely	with	an	opportunity	 for	the	citizens	 to	express	 their	view	on	such	an	 important	aspect	of	 the	society	as	marriage,	 in	a	most	democratic	of	all	procedures	–	a	 referendum	–	 that	 justice	will	be	confirmed	as	 the	very																																									 																					6	Constitution	 of	 the	 Republic	 of	 Croatia	 (2010),	 art.	 35.	 This	 is	 briefly	 summarised	 in	 Orsolic	 Dalessio	(2014).	7	The	full	statement	(in	Croatian)	can	be	found	here:	http://www.pravo.unizg.hr/?@=6fkw	8	Whilst	 the	 churches,	 and	 the	 Catholic	 Church	 in	 particular	 played	 a	 significant	 role	 in	 making	 the	referendum	 resonate	 with	 the	 wider	 population	—	 for	 example,	 it	 would	 urge	 people	 to	 vote	 for	 the	inclusion	 of	 the	 heteronormative	 definition	 of	marriage	 in	 the	 constitution	—,	 its	 support	 in	 the	 actual	debates	 on	 the	 referendum	was	much	more	 indirect.	 Hence,	 although	 the	 influence	 on	 religion	 is	 an	 a	question	worth	researching,	it	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	particular	study,	which	aims	to	draw	attention	to	the	international	dimension	of	the	referendum.	See	Pavasovic	Trost	and	Slootmaeckers	(2015)	on	how	the	Church	used	the	referendum	to	define	the	Croatian	‘nation’.	
	basis	 of	 permanent	piece	 in	 the	Croatian	 society’	 (U	 Ime	Obitelji	 2013).	Although	 the	Catholic	Church	did	not	directly	campaign,	Cardinal	Bozanić,	Head	of	the	Catholic	Church	in	Croatia,	said	that	 elected	 officials	 have	 the	 duty	 to	 represent	 their	 citizens,	 so	 officials	 who	 had	 come	 out	against	the	referendum	were	unfairly	discriminating	against	a	group	of	its	citizens	(Hina	2014).	Cardinal	Bozanić	also	wrote	a	letter	declaring	‘Marriage	is	the	only	union	enabling	procreation,’	which	was	 read	 aloud	 across	 churches	 in	 the	 country	 the	 day	 after	 the	 referendum	 (Bilefsky	2013).	Framing	the	referendum	in	terms	of	Croatian	family	values	further	resonates	with	latent	nationalist	 feelings	 in	 Croatia,	 as	 the	 future	 of	 the	 nation	 would	 be	 threatened	 by	 the	introduction	 of	 same-sex	 marriages	 (Pavasovic	 Trost	 and	 Slootmaeckers	 2015).	 Although	 an	explicit	 link	 to	 the	 EU	 was	 avoided	 by	 the	 Catholic	 Church,	 it	 was	 clearly	 suggested	 that	 a	(European)	 threat	 to	 the	Croatian	 family,	 and	nation	 in	 extension,	 existed	 (cf.	 Ayoub	2014	on	perceived	threat).	This	view	resonated	well	with	the	Croatian	population.	Indeed,	a	brief	look	at	personal	 statements	 of	 volunteers	 on	 the	 website	 of	 U	 Ime	 Obitelji	 further	 corroborates	 the	importance	 of	 ‘saving	 the	 nation’	 as	 a	 motivation	 to	 support	 the	 initiative,	 as	 they	 include	phrases	 like:	 ‘A	 healthy	 family	 is	 the	 foundation	 of	 a	 healthy	 society	 and	 a	 stable	 society	guarantees	 the	 stable	 state’,	 ‘This	 is	 a	 very	 important	 thing	 for	 Croatia	 and	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	involve	all.	The	family	is	the	fundamental	unit	of	society,	with	no	family	no	people,’	and	‘saving	the	marriage	and	family	is	the	only	thing	that	will	rescue	the	Croatian	society	from	collapsing.’9	Although	 not	 always	 made	 explicit,	 the	 frequent	 use	 of	 this	 nationalist	 rhetoric	 calls	 for	 the	protection	 and	 preservation	 of	 true	 Croatian	 values,	 family,	 and	 nation	 from	 Western	 (i.e.,	European)	vices,	such	as	same-sex	partnerships,	which	undermine	the	fundamental	unit	of	the	Croatian	society	(Pavasovic	Trost	and	Slootmaeckers	2015).		On	 the	other	side,	 the	opposition	(the	Protiv	[Against]	campaign)	was	strongly	supported	by	a	number	 of	 academicians,	 human	 rights	 organisations,	 and	 LGBT	 groups.	 The	 campaign	 was	framed	in	terms	of	minority	protection	and	as	a	dangerous	move	away	from	‘European’	 ideals.																																									 																					9	For	more	personal	statements	see:	http://referendumobraku.uimeobitelji.net/category/volontiram-jer/	
	President	Josipović	said:	‘A	nation	is	judged	by	its	attitude	toward	minorities’	(Associated	Press	2013).	One	political	analyst,	Jaroslav	Pecnik,	noted	that	the	referendum	showed	that	Croatia	was	not	‘mature	enough’	to	be	in	Europe	and	that	it	indicated	a	fascist	turn	(Kartus	2013).	The	major	daily	newspaper	Jutarnji	list	made	an	editorial	decision	to	oppose	the	referendum,	since	it	was	discriminatory,	 and	would	donate	banner	 advertisement	 space	 for	organisations	opposing	 the	vote	 (Radić	 2013).	 The	 Protiv	 campaign	 cautioned	 that	 the	 same-sex	 marriage	 referendum	would	be	only	the	start,	and	that	new	citizen-initiated	referendums	could	be	used	to	curb	ethnic	and	other	minority	group	rights.	Protiv	supporters	actively	tried	to	extend	the	campaign	against	the	 referendum	 beyond	 the	 LGBT	 issue,	 linking	 it	 to	 a	 more	 general	 minority	 protection	discourse	(Glasaj	Protiv	2013).	In	similar	vein,	Vesna	Pusić,	the	Deputy	Prime	Minister,	warned	that	the	referendum	was	being	used	as	an	instrument	of	discrimination	against	a	minority,	and	that	it	would	be	used	in	the	future	against	other	minorities	whether	by	race,	ethnicity,	political	affiliation,	or	gender	(Hina	2013).	She	added	that	everyone	is	a	member	of	some	minority	group	at	 some	point	 in	 their	 lives.	 The	 link	 between	 the	marriage	 referendum	and	 general	minority	rights	was	 further	 foreshadowed	by	anti-Cyrillic	protests	 in	 the	eastern	city	of	Vukovar	 (April	2013)	 and	 the	 campaign	 of	 Stožer	 za	 Obranu	 Hrvatskog	 Vukovara	 [The	 Committee	 for	 the	Defence	 of	 Croatian	 Vukovar],	 launched	 in	 November	 2013,	 to	 collect	 signatures	 to	 call	 for	 a	referendum	to	curb	minority	language	rights	(Ivanovic	2013a).10		Despite	 the	 organised	 opposition	 by	 the	 Croatian	 Government	 and	 a	 number	 of	 civil	 society	actors,	 the	marriage	 referendum	passed	with	 a	majority	 of	 66%	on	1	December	 2013,	with	 a	turnout	of	less	than	38%.	The	result	of	the	referendum	did	not	differ	much	from	those	predicted	in	 opinion	 polls	 conducted	 six	months	 before	 the	 vote	 to	 the	 referendum	 itself;	 support	 only	changed	 from	 55%	 to	 66%	 (see	 Žic	 2013).	 The	 existing	 literature	 suggests	 three	 reasons	 for	relatively	low	volatility	in	marriage	referendum	voting	intentions.	First,	when	partisan	cues	on																																									 																					10	Campaigners	managed	 to	 collect	680,000	 signatures	 (Ivanovic	2013b).	The	Government	 confirmed	 in	July	 2014	 that	 the	 requirement	 to	 trigger	 a	 referendum	had	 been	 fulfilled	 (Ivanovic	 2014),	 though	 the	Constitutional	Court	subsequently	declared	the	question	unconstitutional	in	August	2014	(Milekic	2014).	
	referendums	are	strong,	there	tends	to	be	predictable	patterns	(Leduc	2002),	and	indeed,	nearly	86%	of	HDZ	supporters	and	less	than	40%	of	SDP	supporters	said	that	they	would	vote	for	the	referendum	a	week	before	the	actual	poll	(Lukić	2013).	Second,	preferences	for	the	issue	were	defined	 by	 voters’	 core	 beliefs,	 which	 tend	 to	 be	 difficult	 to	 change	 (Leduc	 2002).	 Third,	campaigns	 during	 citizen-initiated	 referendums	 may	 make	 a	 difference,	 but	 there	 is	 little	comparative	 evidence	 of	 reversals	 of	 voting	 intention	 (Bowler	 and	 Donovan	 2002),	 though	effective	campaign	mobilisation	might	affect	voter	turnout	(Leduc	2002).		Additionally,	 drawing	 on	 claims	 by	 Croatian	 commentators	 in	 the	 wake	 of	 the	 marriage	referendum	result,	a	number	of	hypothesis	about	the	voting	patterns	can	be	identified,	of	which	the	most	 important	ones	are	summarised	here.	First,	one	columnist	 in	 Jutarnji	list	 reduced	the	results	to	a	referendum	on	satisfaction	with	the	current	Croatian	government,	stating:	‘This	vote	is	 not	 about	marriage	 or	 the	 definition	 of	 marriage,	 this	 is	 a	 referendum	 against	 the	 current	government’	 (quoted	 in	EurActiv	2013).	Second,	although	Serbian	Orthodox	 leaders	 joined	the	Catholic	Church	in	supporting	the	referendum,	the	minority	rights	framing	by	those	against	the	referendum	may	have	found	some	resonance	with	the	Serb	minority	in	Croatia,	especially	after	the	 aforementioned	 ‘anti-Cyrillic’	 protests	 and	 petition	 for	 a	 language	 rights	 referendum.	 For	example,	the	tiny	village	of	Negoslavci,	near	Vukovar,	had	a	vote	of	75%	against	the	referendum,	which	earned	it	the	title	of	Croatia’s	‘most	tolerant	place’	by	Jutarnji	list.	It	has	fewer	than	1200	inhabitants,	 who	 are	 overwhelmingly	 Serb.	 A	 commentary	 written	 after	 the	 referendum	surmised	 that	 the	 citizens	of	 the	village	 linked	 the	question	 in	 the	 referendum	 to	 the	ongoing	anti-Cyrillic	campaign	(Patković	2013).	The	importance	of	socio-economic	woes	in	the	wake	of	the	global	economic	downturn	is	connected	to	a	third	explanation,	which	links	attitudes	towards	the	EU	and	economic	conditions.	As	mentioned	in	the	introduction,	some	analysts	believed	that	advocates	 for	 the	referendum	were	able	 to	harness	voters’	disillusionment	with	 the	EU,	which	they	 link	to	 the	economic	downturn	 in	Croatia.	Fourth	and	most	 importantly	 to	 this	study,	 the	EU	 is	 also	 connected	 with	 ‘creeping	 secularism’	 in	 the	 country,	 or	 as	 a	 campaigner	 for	 the	
	referendum	 stated:	 ‘There	 is	 a	 feeling	 that	 gay	 marriage	 and	 adoption	 by	 gays	 was	 on	 the	agenda,	and	this	vote	was	an	attempt	 to	show	that	 there	 is	strong	opposition	to	 this’	 (Bilefsky	2013).	In	other	words,	there	is	a	clear	suggestion	of	the	presence	of	a	value-based	Eurosceptic	fear	that	a	spillover	process	would	take	place,	where	the	increasing	number	of	same-sex	union	policies	within	the	EU	would	indirectly	impact	the	definition	of	marriage	in	Croatia	(cf.	Kopecký	and	Mudde	2002;	 Leconte	 2008;	 Leconte	 2014).	 Such	 feeling	 could	 only	 have	 been	 fuelled	 by	reporting	 on	 EU	 discussions	 on	 ‘mutual	 recognition’	 of	 same-sex	 partnership	 across	 the	 EU,	which	the	media	reported	on	as	the	EU	forcing	Croatia’s	hand	(Palokaj	2013).	The	question	remains,	however,	whether	this	value-based	Euroscepticism	was	indeed	reflected	in	the	referendum	results.	In	other	words,	was	Kevin	Moss	(2014,	p.	228)	right	to	remark	that:	‘the	referendum	results	also	showed	that	the	more	European	(and	less	Balkan)	parts	of	Croatia	were	indeed	more	tolerant’?	The	 primary	 objective	 of	 this	 article	 is	 to	 examine	 municipal-level	 voting:	 to	 see	 whether	contemporary	 commentaries	 about	 voting	 patterns	 during	 the	 referendum	 can	 be	 verified	 or	refuted,	especially	the	link	between	support	for	the	EU	and	support	for	constitutional	protection	of	heterosexual	marriage.	 Since	 the	data	are	only	disaggregated	at	 the	municipal	 level,	we	are	unable	 to	 ascertain	 individual	motives	 for	 voting	 behaviour,	 but	we	 can	 establish	 how	 voting	varied	amongst	communities	across	the	country.		
Data	and	Analyses		
Individual-level	Data	and	Analysis			Since	 value-based	 Euroscepticism	 is	 an	 individual-level	 phenomenon,	 we	 first	 sought	 to	establish	 whether	 there	 is	 sufficient	 evidence	 suggesting	 a	 link	 between	 value-based	Euroscepticism	 and	 attitudes	 towards	 homosexuality	 at	 the	 individual	 level.	 To	 do	 this	 we	
	analysed	the	most	recent	social	attitudes	survey	conducted	in	Croatia	that	contained	questions	about	 attitudes	 towards	 homosexuality	 as	 well	 as	 an	 acceptable	 operationalization	 of	 value-based	Euroscepticism	—	in	the	case	of	Croatia,	this	is	the	2008	European	Values	Survey	(EVS).	We	 used	 respondents’	 answer	 to	 the	 question	 ‘Do	 you	 justify	 homosexuality?’	 (Q68H)	 as	 the	dependent	 variable.	 The	 variable	 is	 originally	 coded	 as	 a	 ten-point	 Likert-scale,	 but	 due	 to	 its	highly	 skewed	 distribution,	 we	 have	 decided	 to	 dichotomise	 the	 variable.	 We	 recoded	 the	variable	 as	 1	 ‘Homosexuality	 is	 not	 justified’	 for	 the	 answers	 ranging	 from	 1	 to	 5,	 and	 0	‘Homosexuality	 is	 justified’	 for	 the	 answers	 6	 to	 10.	 The	 explanatory	 variable	 of	 interest	 is	whether	 respondents	 fear	 EU	 integration	 would	 lead	 Croatia	 to	 ‘lose	 [its]	 national	 identity	 /	culture’	 (Q73B).	 This	 variable	 is	 negatively	 coded	 as	 a	 ten-point	 scale,	 with	 1	 as	 ‘very	 much	afraid	that	the	EU	will	cause	a	loss	of	national	identity/culture’	and	10	as	 ‘not	afraid	at	all	that	EU	will	 cause	 a	 loss	 of	 national	 identity’.	 Thus	 a	 higher	 score	 in	 this	 variable	 represents	 less	value-based	Euroscepticism.	These	two	variables	allow	us	to	analyses	whether	there	is	a	link	in	Croatia	between	value-based	Euroscepticism	and	attitudes	towards	homosexuality.	Using	a	binary	logistic	(logit)	regression,	and	 adding	 controls	 for	 gender,	 age,	 education,	 and	 religious	 affiliation,11	we	 find	 evidence	 of	such	a	relationship,	ceteris	paribus.	We	find	that	the	odds	of	justifying	homosexuality	decreases	by	8.5%	for	an	increase	of	one	point	in	the	level	of	fear	that	the	EU	will	cause	a	loss	of	national	identity,	ceteris	paribus.	The	regression	results	are	reported	in	Table	1.		[TABLE	1	HERE]		
																																								 																					11	We	 use	 religious	 affiliation	 as	measure	 for	 religion	 to	maintain	 consistency	with	 the	 aggregate-level	analysis.	 However,	 we	 also	 conducted	 the	 same	 analysis	 using	 ‘attendance	 of	 religious	 services’	 as	 a	measure	for	religiosity.	Although	not	reported	here,	the	findings	of	both	analyses	were	similar	and	the	link	between	value-based	Euroscepticism	and	homophobia	was	found	in	both	analyses.		
	Although	this	 individual	data	dates	back	to	2008,	we	believe	 it	 to	be	a	strong	 indicator	 for	the	relevance	 of	 our	 current	 study.	 Since	 2008,	 LGBT	 rights	 have	 only	 become	 more	 closely	connected	 to	 the	 idea	of	Europe	(Ayoub	and	Paternotte	2014),	and	more	prominent	 in	 the	EU	Enlargement	process	(Slootmaeckers	and	Touquet	2016).	Hence,	it	is	only	reasonable	to	believe	that	this	link	between	value-based	Euroscepticism	and	homonegativity	has	become	stronger	as	well.	Moreover,	in	the	course	of	the	Croatian	accession	process,	the	issue	of	fundamental	rights	reached	 its	 peak	 after	 2009,	 when	 the	 chapter	 on	 fundamental	 rights	 finally	 opened	 for	negotiations,	 in	 which	 LGBT	 was	 one	 of	 the	 topics.	 And	 more	 recently,	 the	 issue	 same-sex	marriage	(often	seen	as	a	European,	foreign-imposed	agenda)	has	been	framed	as	a	threat	to	the	Croatian	family,	and	in	extension	to	the	Croatian	nation	(cf.	supra,	but	also	see	Pavasovic	Trost	and	Slootmaeckers	2015).		With	 this	 initial	 confirmation	 that	 a	 link	 between	 value-based	 Euroscepticism	 and	homonegativity	 exists	 at	 the	 individual	 level	 in	Croatia,	we	now	 turn	 to	 the	main	 focus	of	 the	article,	 which	 seeks	 to	 explore	 whether	 the	 2013	 marriage	 referendum	 can	 (partly)	 be	interpreted	 as	 a	proxy	 for	 value-based	Euroscepticism.	To	do	 this,	we	 analyse	municipal-level	electoral	data	to	see	whether	we	observe	similar	patterns.		
Municipal-level	Data		Our	 examination	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 attitudes	 towards	 the	 EU	 and	 voting	 in	 the	constitutional	referendum	of	2013	uses	cities	and	municipalities	(henceforth	also	shortened	as	municipalities)	as	units	of	analysis.	We	obtained	electoral	data	from	detailed	results	available	on	the	 State	Electoral	Commission	of	 the	Republic	 of	Croatia	 and	 the	demographic	data	 from	 the	Croatian	Bureau	 of	 Statistics.	 Results	 for	 three	 recent	 polls	were	 included	 in	 the	 analysis:	 the	Croatian	Marriage	Referendum	(December	2013);	the	Croatian	EU	referendum	(January	2012);	and	 the	 first	 Croatian	 European	 Parliament	 election	 (April	 2013).	 Since	we	want	 to	 establish	
	factors	 explaining	 the	 level	 of	 support	 for	 the	 marriage	 referendum,	 we	 excluded	 the	 2014	European	 election	 and	 the	 2011	 parliamentary	 election,	 since	 the	 former	 occurred	 after	 the	marriage	 referendum,	 and	 the	 latter	 occurred	 long	 before	 the	 referendum	 and	with	 different	constituency	boundaries.12	In	addition	 to	 the	 referendum	data,	we	also	used	data	 from	 the	2013	European	Parliament	 to	gauge	the	right-left	ideological	tendencies	of	municipalities	and	cities.	Given	the	complex	party	landscape	 of	 Croatia,	 with	many	 small	 parties,	 we	 focused	 in	 our	 analysis	 on	 the	main	 right-leaning	 party	 HDZ,	 and	 the	 main	 left-leaning	 party	 SDP	 (Socijaldemokratska	Partija	Hrvatske	[Social	 Democratic	 Party	 of	 Croatia]).	 As	 a	 proxy	 for	 the	 average	 ideological	 orientation	 of	 a	municipality,	we	used	the	difference	of	 the	vote-shares	(in	percentages)	 in	the	2013	European	election	 between	 HDZ	 and	 SDP,	 with	 a	 positive	 figure	 representing	 higher	 levels	 of	 electoral	support	for	the	mainstream	(right-wing)	nationalist	HDZ.13		Using	2011	Croatian	census	data	at	the	city/municipality	level,		we	included	controls	for:	gender;	age;	 education;	 and	 religiosity.	 These	 control	 variables	 were	 selected	 based	 on	 previous	research	on	individuals’	attitudes	towards	homosexuality.	Previous	individual-level	comparative	research	on	the	Western	Balkans	has	shown	that	levels	of	homonegativity	tend	to	be	lower	for	women	compared	with	men;	those	with	higher	levels	of	education;	and	those	with	lower	levels	of	 religiosity	 (Brajdić	 Vuković	 and	 Štulhofer	 2012,	 p.	 224).	 Based	 on	 the	 above-mentioned	suggestions	 that	 the	 referendum	 tapped	 into	 economic	 grievances	 and	 on	 minority	 issues	 in	general,	 we	 included	 additional	 controls	 for	 unemployment	 and	 ethnicity,	 which	 have	 been	found	to	have	significant	effects	on	voting	patterns	for	the	marriage	referendum	(Glaurdić	and	Vuković	2016).	Gender	was	expressed	as	a	percentage	of	females	in	the	locale.	The	mean	age	of	the	active	population	(>	15	years	old)	was	calculated	using	group	midpoints	(age	is	categorised																																									 																					12	The	 two	 referendums	 and	European	Parliament	 election	 take	Croatia	 as	 a	 single	 constituency,	whilst	parliamentary	 elections	 are	 run	 in	 ten	different	 Croatian	 constituencies,	 one	 constituency	 for	Diaspora,	and	one	constituency	for	national	minorities.		13	We	also	use	the	relative	vote-share	between	SDP	and	HDZ	as	a	proxy	for	government	support,	since	the	former	are	the	main	ruling	party	and	the	latter	are	the	main	opposition	party.	
	in	 five-year	 intervals	 in	 the	 census	 data,	 with	 the	 oldest	 category	 being	 95	 years	 of	 age	 and	above).	We	calculated	the	percentage	of	active	populations	that	completed	higher	education	as	a	measure	 for	 average	 education	 in	 a	 municipality.	 To	 gauge	 the	 mean	 religiosity	 within	 a	municipality,	 we	 used	 the	 percentage	 of	 census	 respondents	 who	 said	 that	 they	 were	 not	religious	or	atheists.	Unemployment	is	measured	as	the	percentage	of	unemployed	people	aged	15	 or	 older.	 This	 percentage	 excludes	 economically	 inactive	 people,	 e.g.	 students	 and	 retired	people.	 Finally,	we	 included	 the	 percentage	 of	 census	 respondents	within	 a	municipality	who	said	that	they	were	Serbs	since	they	are	the	largest	national	minority	in	Croatia	(with	4.36%	of	the	population).	The	descriptive	statistics	for	all	variables	are	summarised	in	Table	2.		[TABLE	2	HERE]		
Municipal-level	Analysis		We	conduct	a	path	analysis	in	order	to	examine	the	extent	to	which	the	outcome	of	the	marriage	referendum	 can	 be	 explained	 by	 attitudes	 towards	 the	 EU.	 We	 selected	 this	 technique	 over	regular	multivariate	regression	for	two	reasons:	the	structure	of	our	data;	and	the	complexity	of	our	causal	model.	As	our	dataset	is	compiled	by	combining	census	data	and	electoral	data	from	three	 different	 events,	 the	 variables	 in	 our	model	 are	 temporally	 sequenced,	 and	 there	 is	 no	feedback	 between	 events.	 A	 dynamic	 path	model	 allows	 the	 explicit	modelling	 of	 such	 a	 data	structure.	 The	 temporal	 sequence	 of	 the	 variables,	 furthermore,	 supports	 the	 causality	assumptions	 of	 path	 analysis	 (Tacq	 1997).	 A	 second	 reason	 why	 we	 prefer	 path	 analysis	 to	regular	multivariate	 regression	 analysis	 is	 the	 complex	 causal	 structure	of	 our	 variables.	 Path	analysis	 allows	 for	 modelling	 and	 testing	 intermediate	 causal	 links,	 and	 detecting	 spurious	relationships.	While	multivariate	regression	can	control	 for	variables,	 reducing	 the	problem	of	
	spuriousness	 and	 intermediate	 effects,	 the	 temporal	 sequence	 of	 our	 variables	 suggests	 that	explicitly	 modelling	 these	 indirect	 paths	 is	 warranted.	 We	 estimate	 the	 path	 model	 using	Structural	Equation	Modelling	(SEM).	To	estimate	the	model,	we	use	the	Lavaan	 (v0.5-16)	R	package	(Rosseel	2012).	 	We	estimated	our	final	model	by	starting	with	a	model	of	the	electoral	data	(see	Figure	1),	where	we	control	for	 all	 socio-demographic	 variables	 of	 the	 census	 data.	 To	 improve	 the	 goodness-of-fit	 of	 this	initial	model,	we	deleted	non-significant	paths	from	the	model	stepwise	(backwards	modelling),	whilst	keeping	an	eye	on	 the	modification	 indices	 in	order	 to	ensure	 that	we	did	not	wrongly	omit	 some	 of	 the	 non-significant	 paths.	 To	 test	 the	 indirect	 effects,	 we	 follow	 the	recommendation	 to	 use	 bootstrapped	 standard	 errors	 (see	 e.g.	 Preacher	 and	 Hayes	 2008).	Bootstrapping	standard	errors	has	the	additional	advantage	of	overcoming	potential	violation	of	the	 normality	 assumption	 of	 the	 sampling	 distribution	 of	 the	 estimates	 of	 proportion-based	variables	(Moore	and	McCabe	2005).		[FIGURE	1	HERE]		
Results	of	the	municipal-level	analysis		Figure	 2	 presents	 the	 final	 model	 of	 our	 analyses	 with	 standardised	 coefficients	 for	 all	statistically	significant	paths.	Looking	at	the	model,	it	becomes	immediately	clear	that	we	did	not	find	 any	 effect	 for	 the	 gender	 balance	 of	 the	 community	 on	 any	 of	 our	 endogenous	 variables.	While	gender	is	often	cited	as	one	of	the	main	explanations	of	individuals’	behaviour,	we	believe	that	 the	 lack	 of	 a	 gender	 effect	 in	 this	 study	 is	 due	 to	 our	 unit	 of	 analysis.	 By	 studying	 the	aggregate	level,	we	believe	the	individual	differences	between	men	and	women	are	cancelled	out	by	 a	 gender	 composition	 of	 the	 community.	 This	 is	 because	 the	 variation	 in	 gender	 balance	
	across	municipalities	is	small:	the	proportion	of	women	in	a	municipality	is	on	average	50.75%	(stand.	dev.	=	1.198)	and	ranges	from	45.26%	to	54.00%	(see	Table	1).	Although	the	outcome	of	the	marriage	referendum	is	the	main	variable	of	interest,	for	the	sake	of	completeness,	we	will	discuss	the	results	of	our	analysis	step-by-step,	from	left	to	right.	Thus,	although	we	start	our	discussion	with	by	a	brief	discussion	of	our	results	for	the	EU	referendum	variables	and	work	our	way	through	the	path	model	all	the	way	to	the	outcome	of	the	marriage	referendum,	i.e.	the	proportion	of	‘yes’	votes,	such	description	should	not	be	interpreted	from	a	comparative	angle.14	In	fact,	we	provide	such	detailed	description	to	enable	a	full	understanding	of	 the	path	model	and	 the	complexity	of	 indirect	effects	of	different	variables	on	 the	marriage	referendum	outcome.			First,	 regarding	 the	 turnout	 for	 the	 EU	 referendum	 in	 January	 2012,	 we	 find	 that	 in	municipalities	 with	 a	 lower	 age	 average,	 a	 higher	 percentage	 of	 higher	 educated	 people,	 less	unemployed	people,	and	a	lower	proportion	of	Serbs	the	turnout	for	the	EU	referendum	tends	to	be	higher	(Table	3).	When	it	comes	to	the	percentage	of	Eurosceptic	votes	(that	is,	votes	against	EU	accession),	we	find	that	communities	with	fewer	unemployed	people,	fewer	Serbs,	and	fewer	non-religious	people	were	more	likely	to	have	voted	against	EU	accession.	In	addition	to	these	socio-demographic	 effects,	 we	 find	 that	 the	 percentage	 of	 ‘no’	 votes	 tend	 to	 be	 higher	 in	municipalities	 with	 a	 higher	 turnout	 for	 the	 EU	 referendum.	 These	 results,	 however,	 do	 not	necessarily	reflect	the	relation	between	these	characteristics	and	votes	against	EU	accession	at	the	individual	level.	This	difference	between	individual	level	and	aggregate	level	effects	is	clearly	illustrated	 by	 the	 effects	 of	 education	 and	 age	 on	 Euroscepticism.	 While	 older	 and	 lesser	educated	people	tend	to	say	no	to	EU	accession	at	the	individual	level	(Štulhofer	2006;	Tverdova	and	Anderson	2004),	we	do	not	find	such	an	effect	on	the	aggregate	level.																																									 																					14	Indeed,	 the	aim	of	 this	article	 is	not	 to	explain	 the	outcome	of	 the	EU	referendum.	Rather	we	seek	 to	shed	 light	 on	 the	 link	 between	 the	 EU	 referendum	 and	 the	marriage	 referendum.	 In	 order	 to	 test	 this	relationship	accurately,	it	 is	important	to	understand	the	determinants	for	both	referendum	variables	in	order	 to	 be	 assured	 that	 our	 conclusions	 are	 not	 an	 attribute	 of	 spurious	 relationships.	Moreover,	 the	step-by-step	presentation	follows	common	practice	for	the	reporting	of	path	models.		
	The	 above	 aggregate-level	 analysis	 also	 provides	 an	 interesting	 result	 regarding	 religion,	whereby	communities	with	more	religious	people	(i.e.,	Catholics)	tended	to	have	higher	levels	of	Eurosceptic	 votes.	 This	 is	 surprising,	 given	 that	 the	 Catholic	 Church	 urged	 voters	 to	 support	accession	in	the	2012	referendum	(Vatican	Insider	2012),	and	Catholics	are	comparatively	more	likely	to	have	positive	attitudes	towards	European	integration	in	other	countries	(Nelsen,	Guth	&	Fraser	 2001).	 Perica	 (2006)	 found	 two	 dominant	 strands	 in	 Croatian	 Church	 framings	 of	accession,	 both	 of	which	 are	 pro-EU:	 clericalists	 see	 Croatian	 Catholicism	 as	 special,	 and	 as	 a	bulwark	against	the	‘East’,	which	should	be	rewarded	with	membership;	and	liberals	see	Croatia	as	being	a	modern	country	with	strong	European	credentials	which	would	be	furthered	through	accession.	 This	 being	 the	 case,	 one	 would	 expect	 that	 support	 for	 EU	 membership	 is	 not	determined	by	religiosity.	Nevertheless,	 it	has	been	observed	 that	Croatian	Church	played	and	still	plays	a	balancing	act	of	being	a	‘pro-EU	Eurosceptic,’	taking	critical	positions	on	the	foreign	ownership	 of	 real	 estate	 (by	 Cardinal	 Bozanić)	 and	 the	 delay	 of	 accession	 tied	 to	war-crimes	prosecution	(Perica	2006),	as	well	as	some	of	EU	values	(see	Pavasovic	Trost	and	Slootmaeckers	2015).	 Indeed,	 drawing	 on	 the	 case	 of	 the	 Polish	 Catholic	 Church	 during	 accession	 in	 Poland,	Guerra	(2015)	argues	that	the	Croatian	Church	(and	its	privileged	domestic	position)	might	be	threatened	by	EU-triggered	modernisation/democratisation	processes.	The	Catholic	Church	may	see	itself	in	the	role	of	a	defender	against	secularism	from	the	‘outside’,	and	take	a	Eurosceptic	position	to	defend	national	sovereignty	and	values	(as	it	did	during	the	marriage	referendum).	Thus,	 whilst	 it	 would	 be	 reasonable	 to	 interpret	 the	 municipal-level	 relationship	 between	religiosity	 and	 Eurosceptic	 vote	 in	 2012	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	 Church’s	 ‘mixed	 signals,’	we	remain	 cautious	of	 this	 interpretation	as	 individual-level	 effects	do	not	 always	play	out	 at	 the	aggregate	level.	Alternatively,	the	finding	could	reflect	a	spurious	relationship	due	to	a	variable	omitted	from	our	analysis.	Turning	to	the	vote	difference	between	the	main	opposition	party	(HDZ)	and	main	government	party	 (SDP)	 during	 the	 European	 Parliament	 elections,	 we	 find	 that	 communities	 that	 had	 a	
	higher	 turnout	 for	 the	 EU	 referendum	 were	 more	 likely	 to	 vote	 in	 favour	 of	 the	 current	governing	 party.	 This	 finding	 combined	with	 the	 positive	 relation	 between	 the	 proportion	 of	votes	against	EU	accession	and	the	votes	in	favour	of	the	opposition	supports	Anderson’s	(1998)	notion	that	when	citizens	have	little	knowledge	or	experience	with	the	EU,	they	use	the	national	context	 as	 a	 proxy	 for	 the	 EU.	 Studying	 Croatia,	 Babarović,	 Čilić	 Burušić,	 and	 Burušić	 (2011)	found	 that	 support	 for	 the	 then	HDZ-led	 government	was	 positively	 associated	with	 attitudes	towards	EU	accession.	Although	the	authors	urged	for	a	cautious	interpretation	of	their	results,	our	finding	—	that	communities	which	tended	to	vote	against	EU	accession	are	more	inclined	to	vote	for	the	opposition	party	(i.e.,	HDZ;	since	2011	the	government	is	SDP-led)—	suggests	that	Anderson’s	(1998)	‘support	for	government’	hypothesis	is	credible	within	the	Croatian	context.	The	 negative	 relationship	 between	 turnout	 for	 the	 EU	 referendum	 and	 opposition	 votes,	furthermore,	 corroborates	 this	 notion,	 since	 the	 turnout	 variable,	 which	 in	 the	 model	 is	controlled	for	Euroscepticism,	can	be	interpreted	as	a	proxy	for	favourable	attitudes	towards	the	EU.	The	vote	difference	between	 the	opposition	and	government	party	 is	 further	explained	by	the	average	age,	as	well	as	the	proportion	of	Serbs,	unemployed	people	and	non-religious	people	in	a	municipality,	with	the	opposition	party	receiving	more	votes	in	those	communities	with,	on	average,	an	older	population,	more	unemployed	people,	a	smaller	proportion	of	Serbs,	and	less	non-religious	people.		[FIGURE	2	HERE]		The	turnout	 for	 the	2013	marriage	referendum	in	2013	 is	positively	related	to	the	turnout	 for	the	EU	 referendum.	This	 effect	 can	 easily	 be	 understood	 as	 a	 path	 dependency.	 The	marriage	referendum	turnout	also	tends	to	be	higher	in	municipalities	with	a	higher	percentage	of	people	with	higher	education	and	a	lower	proportion	of	religious	people.	While	the	effect	of	religion	is	easy	to	explain	(the	Croatian	Catholic	Church	strongly	opposes	same-sex	marriage,	and	the	civic	
	initiative	 had	 strong	 ties	 with	 the	 Church	 in	 Croatia),	 the	 effect	 of	 higher	 education	 is	 less	obvious.	 One	 explanation	 could	 be	 that	 higher	 educated	 people	 were	 more	 aware	 of	 the	consequences	of	the	referendum,	and	were,	therefore,	more	likely	to	go	and	vote.	One	has	to	be	very	cautious,	though,	when	interpreting	the	effect	in	those	terms,	as	we	cannot	be	certain	that	this	 individualistic	 effect	 also	 operates	 at	 the	 aggregate	 level.	 Another,	 more	 aggregate	 level	explanation	would	be	that	higher	educated	people	tend	to	live	in	places	where	there	is	a	higher	turnout,	 like	 in	 urban	 areas,	 i.e.	 there	 is	 a	 possibility	 that	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	proportion	of	educated	people	and	the	marriage	referendum	turnout	is	spurious.	However,	we	lack	the	data	to	test	this	aggregate-level	interpretation.	Additionally,	we	find	that	municipalities	with	 a	higher	percentage	 against	EU	accession	 and	with	more	votes	 for	HDZ	generally	have	 a	higher	turnout	for	the	marriage	referendum.	From	this,	we	can	conclude	that	more	Eurosceptic	municipalities	tend	to	have	a	higher	turnout	for	the	referendum.	Again,	one	has	to	be	cautious	when	 interpreting	 the	 effect	 of	 the	 votes	 for	 the	 opposition	 party,	 though.	 Although	we	 have	earlier	 said	 that	 the	 votes	 for	 the	 opposition	 party	 can	 indeed	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 proxy	 for	Euroscepticism,	the	effect	of	this	variable	on	other	variables	might	follow	other	causes,	for	it	can	also	point	to	the	different	between	a	vote	for	a	more	right-wing	versus	a	more	left-wing	party,	or	between	a	conservative	and	progressive	party.	So,	while	we	do	find	an	effect	for	the	opposition	vote	on	the	turnout	of	the	marriage	referendum,	the	causes	of	this	effect	remain	unclear.		[TABLE	3	HERE]		Finally,	the	outcome	of	the	marriage	referendum	is	very	well	explained	by	our	model	(R2=	.846;	see	Table	3).	As	the	percentage	of	‘yes’	votes	for	the	marriage	referendum	is	the	variable	of	main	interest,	we	decomposed	the	effects	of	all	variables	into	direct	and	indirect	effects	(see	Table	3).	If	we	look	at	the	effects	of	the	socio-demographic	variables	on	the	proportion	of	‘yes’	votes,	we	first	 find	 that	 there	 is	 no	 direct	 effect	 of	 the	 average	 age	 of	 a	municipality.	 So	while	 age	 is	 a	
	strong	predictor	 for	homophobia	at	 the	 individual	 level,	we	do	not	 find	such	an	effect	(at	 least	not	directly)	at	the	aggregate	level.	This,	however,	does	not	mean	that	there	is	no	effect	at	all	of	the	average	age	on	the	referendum	result,	for	age	has	a	positive	indirect	effect	(b	=	.681;	ß	.148)	on	 the	 proportion	 of	 yes	 votes	 via	 the	 ‘EU	 turnout’	 and	 the	 difference	 between	 shares	 of	 the	main	 opposition	 and	 government	 party	 in	 the	 European	 Parliament	 elections.	 For	 the	 other	socio-demographic	variables,	we	find	a	rather	large	and	strong	effect	of	the	percentage	of	non-religious	people	(both	directly	and	indirectly).	We	also	find	a	negative	effect	of	the	proportion	of	Serbs	 on	 the	 outcome	 of	 the	 marriage	 referendum.	 While	 the	 effect	 of	 the	 proportion	 of	unemployed	people	is	positive,	with	the	indirect	path	being	the	strongest	component,	the	direct	effect	 of	 education	 is	 negative	 (the	 combined	 indirect	 effect	 of	 education	 is	 not	 significant	 as	both	indirect	paths	cancel	each	other	out).	Taking	all	this	together,	we	find	that	the	proportion	of	votes	 in	 favour	 of	 the	 constitutional	 definition	 of	 marriage	 tends	 to	 be	 higher	 in	 those	municipalities	with	a	higher	average	age,	more	unemployed	people,	and	a	smaller	proportion	of	higher	education	people,	Serbs,	and	non-religious	people.		Turning	to	the	variables	of	main	interest,	if	the	outcome	of	the	referendum	was	partly	guided	by	value-based	 Euroscepticism,	 we	 would	 expect	 a	 significant	 effect	 of	 our	 EU	 variables	 (vote	against	EU	 accession	 and	outcome	 for	EU	 referendum)	on	 the	percentage	of	 yes	 votes	 for	 the	marriage	 referendum.	At	 the	 same	 time,	we	would	 expect	 this	 effect	 to	 be	 smaller	 than	 some	other	dimensions	that	dominated	the	debates	prior	to	the	referendum	(i.e.	religiosity	and	moral	orientation,	 conservative	 versus	 progressive,	 and	 the	 ethnic	 minority	 frames).	 Our	 results	indeed	 support	 these	 hypotheses.	 We	 find	 confirmation	 that	 the	 outcome	 of	 the	 marriage	referendum	is	partly	guided	by	value-based	Euroscepticism,	at	least	at	the	aggregate	level.	First,	we	 find	 positive	 indirect	 and	 direct	 effects	 of	 Eurosceptic	 votes	 in	 the	 EU	 referendum	 on	 the	outcome	of	the	marriage	referendum.	In	municipalities	with	a	higher	proportion	of	votes	against	EU	accession	 the	proportion	of	 yes	 votes	 in	 the	marriage	 referendum	 tends	 to	be	higher	 (ß	=	.111;	 p	 <	 .001).	 This	 significant	 direct	 effect	 supports	 the	 hypothesis	 that	 the	 marriage	
	referendum	tapped	into	disenchantment	with	the	EU.	A	finding	which	is	further	corroborated	by	the	 indirect	 effect	 via	 the	 difference	 in	 vote	 share	 of	 the	 main	 opposition	 and	 government	parties,	which	as	we	have	 shown	above	 can	be	 interpreted	as	 a	proxy	 for	Euroscepticism	 (ß=	.153;	p	<	.001).15	The	European	dimension	of	the	referendum	outcome,	albeit	secondary,	is	also	confirmed	by	the	strong	effect	of	Europhile	measure	(EU	referendum	turnout)	on	the	outcome	of	the	marriage	referendum.	In	municipalities	with	a	higher	EU	turnout,	which	here	is	interpreted	as	a	proxy	for	pro-EU	attitudes,	the	proportion	of	votes	in	favour	of	the	constitutional	definition	of	marriage	 tends	 to	be	 lower	 (ß	=	 -	 .543;	p	<	 .001).	Our	 interpretation	of	 the	EU	referendum	turnout	and	‘yes’	votes	for	the	marriage	referendum	as	a	link	between	pro-EU	attitudes	and	the	marriage	 referendum	 is	 further	 supported	 by	 our	 finding	 that	 the	 indirect	 effect	 of	 the	 EU	turnout	via	its	Eurosceptic	paths	(via	votes	against	EU	accession)	is	not	significant	(see	Table	3).	In	sum,	our	model	 is	very	successful	 in	explaining	 the	outcome	of	 the	marriage	referendum	at	the	municipal	level.	We	find	four	main	dimensions	that	influenced	the	proportion	of	yes	votes	in	a	 community:	 religious,	 minority,	 domestic	 politics,	 and	 EU	 dimensions.	 We	 found	 that	 in	communities	 where	 there	 are	 proportionally	 less	 non-religious	 people,	 i.e.	 more	 religious	communities,	the	support	for	the	constitutional	definition	of	marriage	was	generally	higher.	This	result	is	not	surprising	given	the	origin	of	the	civic	initiative	and	the	support	it	gained	from	the	Church.	Secondly,	we	find	that	the	tactic	of	the	protiv	campaign	to	make	the	referendum	about	minority	 rights,	 rather	 than	 just	 LGBT	 rights,	 found	 resonance	 since	 our	 results	 show	 that	 in	community	 with	 a	 larger	 proportion	 of	 the	 Serb	 minority	 the	 support	 for	 the	 marriage	referendum	 was	 generally	 lower.	 Thirdly,	 our	 analyses	 support	 the	 claim	 of	 some	 political	analysts	that	the	referendum	was	able	to	tap	into	the	growing	disenchantment	with	the	EU	and	
																																								 																					15	When	interpreting	the	effects	of	the	difference	in	vote	share	of	the	opposition	and	government	parties,	one	 has	 to	 remain	 cautious	 as	 this	 variable	 also	 reflects	 Euroscepticism	 when	 included	 in	 a	 path	containing	an	EU	variable.	On	its	own,	however,	the	variable	reflects	the	difference	between	more	right-wing	conservative,	and	more	left-wing	progressive	parties,	especially	when	not	included	in	path	including	a	Eurosceptic	measure.	Therefore,	we	are	 inclined	to	 interpret	 the	positive	direct	and	 indirect	effects	of	the	difference	in	vote	share	as	a	consequence	of	this	conservative-progressive	dimension.		
	thus	value-based	Euroscepticism.	We	find	that	support	for	the	EU	(measured	here	as	turnout	for	the	EU	referendum)	and	scepticism	 towards	 the	EU	 (measured	as	votes	against	EU	accession)	are	respectably	negatively	and	positively	related	to	the	proportion	of	‘yes’	votes	in	the	marriage	referendum.	These	effects	become	stronger	when	we	 take	 into	account	 the	difference	 in	votes	for	 the	 opposition	 and	 government	 parties,	 which	 as	 part	 of	 the	 EU	 related	 paths	 can	 be	interpreted	as	a	proxy	for	disenchantment	with	the	EU.	Finally,	in	line	with	the	work	of	Glaurdić	and	Vuković	(2016),	who	argued	that	the	referendum	can	be	explained	by	support	for	the	main	electoral	 block	 in	 Croatia,	 we	 identified	 governmental	 support	 as	 the	 fourth	 dimension	influencing	the	marriage	referendum	outcome.	Thus,	we	find	partial	support	for	the	statement	of	the	Jutarnji	list	commentator	that	‘This	vote	is	not	about	marriage	or	the	definition	of	marriage,	this	is	a	referendum	against	the	current	government’	(quoted	in	EurActiv	2013).	Municipalities,	where	 the	 governmental	 parties	 did	 better	 than	 the	 oppositional	 parties	 in	 the	 2013	 EP	elections,	showed	less	support	for	the	marriage	referendum.		
Conclusion		We	started	this	analysis	with	the	modest	goal	to	empirically	test	claims	made	in	the	immediate	aftermath	 of	 the	 2013	 Croatian	 marriage	 referendum.	 However,	 by	 doing	 so	 the	 article	 also	extends	 our	 understanding	 of	 the	 proxy	 politics	 of	 the	 referendum	 by	 adding	 a	 European	dimension.	 Indeed,	 whereas	 Glaurdić	 and	 Vuković	 (2016)	 focussed	 their	 analysis	 on	 the	domestic	proxy	politics	of	 the	referendum,	we	argued	 that	 the	 topic	of	 the	referendum	has	an	undeniable	 international	 and	 European	 characteristic	 and	 failing	 to	 recognise	 the	 European	politics	of	same-sex	marriage	would	provide	only	a	partial	analysis	of	the	referendum	outcome.	This	 is	 especially	 the	 case	 if	 one	 considers	 that	 the	 referendum	 campaign	 started	 around	 the	time	 of	 Croatia’s	 accession	 to	 the	 EU,	 and	when	 the	 actors	 within	 the	 EU	were	 engaged	 in	 a	
	discussion	on	the	 freedom	of	movement	of	LGBT	couples	—	and	thus	of	mutual	recognition	of	same-sex	 partnerships.	 In	 order	 to	 analyse	 the	 European	 dimension	 of	 the	 referendum,	 we	employed	Leconte’s	(2014)	notion	of	value-based	Euroscepticism	as	analytical	framework,	as	a	bridge	between	the	domestic	and	European	political	dimensions	of	the	marriage	vote.	The	value-based	 Euroscepticism	 framework	 suggests	 that	 the	 EU’s	 fundamental	 rights	 policy	 sparked	 a	fear	 that	 closer	 European	 integration	would	 alter	 and	 threaten	 the	 fundamental	 values	 of	 the	nation.	 Thus,	 the	 increasing	 recognition	 of	 same-sex	 marriages	 and	 the	 EU’s	 creeping	homonationalism	lead	the	feeling	that	Croatia’s	membership	of	the	EU	would	put	the	same-sex	marriage	on	the	political	agenda.	That	being	the	case,	the	referendum	could	then	be	interpreted	as	a	pre-emptive	measure	to	block	any	spillover	effect	from	EU	membership	on	Croatian	family	values.		Empirically,	we	analysed	the	politics	of	the	2013	marriage	referendum	in	two	stages.	First,	we	established	at	the	individual	level	that	a	link	between	value-based	Euroscepticism	and	attitudes	towards	homosexuality	is	indeed	present	in	Croatia.	Whilst	we	believe	this	preliminary	analysis	was	 a	 prerequisite	 for	 analysing	 the	 referendum’s	 aggregate	 voting	 behaviour	 using	 a	 value-based	Euroscepticism	analytical	 framework	—such	analysis	would	only	makes	 sense	 if	 such	a	link	 would	 exist	 at	 the	 individual	 level	—	 this	 initial	 analysis	 should	 not	 be	mistaken	 for	 an	invitation	 to	 extrapolate	 our	 results	 to	 the	 individual	 level.	 Indeed,	 the	 reader	 should	 bear	 in	mind	 that	 the	 results	 of	 our	main	 analysis	 only	 speak	 to	 the	 aggregate	 level	 and	 cannot	 and	should	not	be	 translated	 to	 the	 individual	 level.	Whilst	 the	 lack	of	 individual	data	 is	 indeed	an	important	 limitation	 of	 our	 study	—	which	 leaves	 other	 vital	 research	 questions	 unanswered	(e.g.,	relating	individual-level	church	attendance	or	age	(particularly	younger	cohorts)	to	value-based	 Euroscepticism)	 —,	 the	 analysis	 of	 the	 aggregate	 level,	 nevertheless,	 still	 provides	important	results	 that	provide	 insights	 in	 the	different	dimensions	that	guided	the	outcome	of	the	 referendum,	 as	 well	 as	 insights	 in	 the	 interaction	 between	 European	 and	 domestic	 LGBT	politics.		
	Indeed,	our	study	discerned	four	distinct,	yet	related,	factors	that	explain	the	level	of	support	in	municipalities	for	the	marriage	referendum.	The	first	two	dimensions	are	not	a	surprise	giving	the	campaign	leading	up	to	the	referendum.	Both	the	religious	character	of	the	citizens’	initiative	and	it	support	from	the	Church,	and	the	efforts	of	the	protiv	campaign	to	frame	the	referendum	in	 terms	 of	 minority	 rights	 (and	 not	 just	 about	 LGBT)	 are	 reflected	 in	 the	 results	 of	 the	referendum.	We	found	that	less	religious	and	more	ethnically	diverse	communities,	i.e.	having	a	larger	Serb	minority,	 showed	 less	support	 for	 the	 introduction	of	a	constitutional	definition	of	marriage.	The	two	other	main	dimensions	support	the	notion	that	LGBT	rights	have	increasingly	become	 a	 symbolic	 political	 issue.	 In	 line	with	 the	 previous	 analyses	 of	 Glaurdić	 and	 Vuković	(2016),	 we	 found	 strong	 effects	 of	 domestic	 politics	 variables,	 i.e.	 support	 for	 the	 ruling	government.	However,	our	results	also	indicate	that	the	European	context	is	an	important,	albeit	secondary,	 part	 of	 the	 explanation	 of	 the	 outcome	 of	 the	 marriage	 referendum.	 In	municipalities/cities	where	the	main	governing	party	did	better	than	the	main	opposition	party	in	the	2013	European	Parliament	elections,	and	where	there	were	larger	turnout	and	less	anti-EU	votes	in	the	2012	referendum,	showed	less	support	for	the	marriage	referendum.	Based	on	these	results	—	and	guided	by	the	existing	link	between	EU	and	homonegativity	at	the	individual	level	—,	we	conclude	that	the	referendum,	at	least	partly,	can	be	interpreted	as	an	expression	of	value-based	 Euroscepticism	 and	 a	 proactive	 attempt	 to	 halt	 the	 Europeanisation	 of	 same-sex	marriage.		Our	analysis,	thus,	has	shown	support	for	the	idea	that	European	politics	cannot	be	discarded	in	Croatian	 same-sex	 marriage	 debates,	 and	 there	 is	 sufficient	 evidence	 to	 conclude	 that	 value-based	Euroscepticism	played	 a	 role	 during	 the	 referendum,	 albeit	 as	 a	 secondary	mechanism.	And	 while	 we	 cannot	 draw	 conclusions	 about	 the	 role	 of	 value-based	 Euroscepticism	 in	individual	voting	behaviour,	our	findings	have	several	 implications	for	future	research.	First,	 it	provides	an	analytical	framework	to	understand	and	research	the	politics	of	more	recent	same-sex	 marriage	 referendums	 in	 other	 countries.	 Second,	 and	 potentially	 more	 importantly,	 our	
	findings	 show	 the	 value	 of	 including	 value-based	 Euroscepticism	 in	 the	 analysis	 of	 (political)	homophobia	in	Central,	Eastern,	and	Southeastern	Europe.	Our	findings,	thus,	contribute	to	and	expand	the	existing	theoretical	 lenses	on	the	homophobic	backlashes	 in	new	EU	member	state	by	 bridging	 the	 arguments	 that	 rely	 on	 nationalism	 (Mole	 2011)	 or	 perceived	 threat	 (Ayoub	2014).	 Indeed,	 whereas	 value-based	 Euroscepticism	 can	 combine	 elements	 of	 both	 the	nationalism	 and	 perceived	 threat	 arguments,	 it	 explicitly	 places	 the	 discussion	 within	 the	international	context	of	the	EU’s	fundamental	rights	policies.	As	such,	our	analysis	contributes	to	the	 overall	 scholarship	 of	 EU	 enlargement	 process	 in	 candidate	 (or	 new)	 member	 states,	especially	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 domestic	 reaction	 to	 and	 rejection	 of	 the	 EU’s	 self-portrait	fundamental	rights	identity.		Moreover,	 the	case	of	Croatia	also	provides	an	 interesting	comparative	case	 to	 further	explore	the	link	between	religion/religiosity	and	Euroscepticism	more	generally	(Nelsen,	Guth	&	Fraser	2001).	Previous	studies	have	concluded	that	micro-level	features	of	religion	are	not	sufficient	to	explain	 levels	of	Euroscepticism.	Thus,	 it	may	be	more	 instructive	 to	 focus	on	 the	macro-level	role	of	religious	institutions	like	the	Catholic	Church	in	how	they	can	enter	political	debates	and	ally	themselves	with	Eurosceptic	parties	(see,	for	example,	Guerra	2012	on	Poland).	As	outlined	above,	the	Croatian	Catholic	Church	plays	a	fine	balancing	act	as	a	‘pro-EU	Eurosceptic’	pushing	for	 the	 country’s	 return	 to	 European	 Christendom	 whilst	 remaining	 cynical	 of	 some	 of	 the	Union’s	policies	(Perica	2006),	and/or	more	vehemently	resisting	threats	to	national	values	and	sovereignty	 (cf.	 Ayoub	 2014)	 in	 the	 face	 of	 a	 secular	 supra-national	 structure	 (Guerra	 2015).	Value-based	Euroscepticism,	then,	proves	to	be	a	valuable	analytical	 framework	to	analyse	the	balancing	 act	 of	 national	 religious	 institutions,	 especially	 in	 a	 comparative	 context	 including	other	new	and	candidate	EU	member	states,	such	as	Serbia	and	its	Orthodox	Church.			Finally,	we	believe	the	 limitations	of	our	analysis,	which	only	presents	an	initial	exploration	of	the	role	of	value-based	Euroscepticism	in	the	marriage	referendum,	should	be	considered	as	an	inspiration	for	avenues	for	further	research.	Indeed,	the	precise	(individual-level)	link	between	
	value-based	 Euroscepticism	 and	 homophobic	 politics	 and	 voting	 behaviour,	 for	 example,	requires	further	scholarly	attention.	Thus,	In	order	to	fully	understand	the	European	dimension	of	same-sex	marriage	referendums,	in	Croatia	and	elsewhere,	additional	qualitative	analyses	are	needed	to	better	understand	individual-level	motivations	to	support	or	oppose	such	initiatives.	This	being	said,	we	want	to	conclude	our	article	with	a	remark	on	the	political	consequences	of	the	 referendum	 in	 Croatia.	 Despite	 the	 marriage	 referendum	 results,	 Croatian	 political	 elites	have	nonetheless	been	able	to	preserve	the	country’s	homonationalist	and	European	credentials	(see	 also	 Moss	 2014).	 A	 few	 months	 after	 the	 December	 2013	 poll,	 the	 Croatian	 parliament	adopted	new	legislation	defining	registered	‘life	partnerships’	for	same-sex	couples.	Although	U	
Ime	Obitelji	 tried	 to	 use	 the	 referendum	 results	 to	 block	 this	 new	 law,	 the	 law	 passed	 by	 an	overwhelming	majority	 (89	 for;	 16	 against)	 in	 parliament.	 Despite	 the	 fact	 that	HDZ	 showed	some	support	for	the	2013	marriage	referendum,	a	majority	of	its	parliamentary	members	voted	in	 favour	 of	 the	 life	 partnership	 bill.	 The	 marriage	 referendum	 results	 led	 to	 more	 symbolic	rather	 than	 substantive	 changes	 in	 LGBT	 rights,	 but	 worryingly,	 foreshadow	 how	 linking	traditionalist	 and	 Eurosceptic	 perspectives	 can	 be	 mobilised	 effectively	 against	 the	 Croatian	(and	European)	status	quo.				
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	Table	1:	Binary	logistic	regression	of	Croatian	attitudes	towards	the	justification	of	homosexuality	
	 Justification	of	
homosexuality	
	 B	 Exp(B)	
gender		
(reference:	male)	
.762***	
(.180)	 2.142	
Religious	affiliation		
(reference:	not	practicing	
religion)	
-	.806***	
(.204)	 .446	
education	
(reference:	middle	education)	 ***	 	
lower	education	 -	1.232***	(.352)	 .292	
higher	education	 .614**	(.190)	 1.848	
Age	
(reference:	30-49	years)	 ***	 	
15-29	 .447*	(.209)	 1.563	
50+	 -	.606**	(.216)	 .545	
	Fear	of	losing	national	
identity	/	culture	(negatively	
coded)	
-	.089**	
(	.026)	 1.093	
Constant	 -	2.245***	(	.300)	 .106	
Nagelkerke	R2	 .142	
*	p	<	.05;	**	p	<	.01;	***	p	<	.001;	SE	in	parentheses.	
The	 dependent	 variable	 is	 whether	 homosexuality	
can	 be	 justified	 (0=justified,	 1=not	 justified).	 -2LL	 =	
909.479;	chi2	=	12.016	(Df	=	8)	p	=	.150.			 	
		
Table	2:	Descriptive	statistics		 Mean	 Standard	deviation	 Median	 Min-max	
Electoral	Data	 	 	 	 	%	Yes	votes	marriage	ref.	 74,31	 15.058	 77.05	 25.00	–	98.13	Turnout	marriage	ref.	 32.70	 8.938	 32.47	 3.03	–	73.20	%	No	votes	EU	ref.	 34.68	 8.337	 34.16	 15.57	–	63.24	Turnout	EU	ref.	 44.45	 8.992	 45.62	 6.18	–	82.32	Opposition	–	Government	votes	(EP	Elec.)	 6.96	 24.523	 4.97	 -83.71	–	77.44	
Control	Variables	 	 	 	 	%	Non-religious	 2.20	 2.581	 1.23	 0.00	–	16.66	%	Higher	educated	 8.83	 5.037	 7.26	 0.88	–	29.56	Average	age	 51.06	 2.459	 50.67	 45.87	–	66.85	%	Unemployed	 8.04	 2.814	 7.728	 0.26	–	17.59	%	Serbs	 5.64	 14.402	 0.910	 0.00	–	97.19	%	Female	 50.75	 1.198	 50.77	 45.26	–	54.00				
	
	 	
	Table	3:	Results	(unstandardised	and	standardised	[in	parentheses]	coefficients)	of	the	path	analysis.	
		
EU	
Referendum	
turnout	
Votes	against	
EU	accession	
Opposition	–	
Government	
votes	(EP	
elections)	
Marriage	
referendum	
Turnout	
Yes	votes		
marriage	referendum		
Direct	
	effects	
Indirect		
effects	
Total		
effects	
Age	(average	of	adults	
[15+])	
-	.686***	
(-	.204)	 	
1.284***	
(.141)	 	 	
.687***	
(.123)	
.687***	
(.123)	
%	Higher	educated	
people	
.349***		
(.196)	 	 	
.631***	
(.357)	
-	.485***	
(-	.164)	
.133	
(.045)	
-	.352***	
(-	.119)	
%	Unemployed	people	 -	.901***	(-.282)	
-	.447***	
(-	.151)	
2.169***	
(.250)	 	
.483***	
(.091)	
.814***	
(.153)	
1.297	***	
(.245)	
%	Serbs	 -	.282***	(-	.452)	
-	.085**	
(-	.147)	
-	.922***	
(-	.545)	 	
-	.272***	
(-	.262)	
-	.128***	
(-	.123)	
-	.399***	
(-	.385)	
%	Non-religious	people	 	
-.548***	
(-	.169)	
-	3.008***	
(-	.3118)	
-	.323*	
(-	.094)	
-	2.217***	
(-	.383)	
-	1.189***	
(-	.205)	
-	3.406	***	
(-	.589)	
EU	Referendum	
turnout	('12)	 	
.166**	
(.179)	
-	1.212***	
(-	.447)	
.497***	
(.501)	
-	.543***		
(-	.327)	
	.018	
(.011)	
-	.525***	
(-	.316)	
Votes	against	EU	
accession	('12)	 	 	
.638***	
(.218)	
.223***	
(.208)	
.199***	
(.111)	
.274***	
(.153)	
.476***	
(.265)	
Opposition	–	
Government	votes	(EP	
elections	’13)	
	 	 	 .214***	(.586)	 .148***	(.241)	 .107***	(.175)	 .255***	(.417)	
Marriage	referendum	
Turnout	('13)	 	 	 	 	
.501***	
(.299)	 /	
.501***	
(.299)	
R2	 .505	 .143	 .466	 .677	 .846	
*	p	<	.05;	**	p	<	.01;	***	p	<	.001;	significant	levels	are	based	on	bootstrapped	standard	errors	(1000	draws).	
Goodness-of-fit:	Chi2	=	2527.981	(Df	=	35;	p	<	001);	CFI	=	.997;	TLI	=	.987;		
RMSEA	=	.042	(90%	confidence	interval:	.005	–	.072);	SRMR	=	.014			 	
	Figure	1:	Starting	model	for	SEM	analyses	(control	variables	omitted).			
Figure	2:	Final	Path	model	with	standardised	path	coefficients,	with	bold	 lines	representing	effects	of	main	
interested	and	dotted	lines	for	control	effects.	
Note:	Goodness-of-fit:	Chi2	=	2527.981	(Df	=	35;	p	<	001);	CFI	=	.997;	TLI	=	.987;		
RMSEA	=	.042	(90%	confidence	interval:	.005	–	.072);	SRMR	=	.014		 	
		
